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IMPOSSIBILITY AND FRUSTRATION
IN SALES CONTRACTS
KIYOSHI IGARASHE* and LUVERN V. RIEKE**
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal principles governing sales under Japanese law, a civil rather
than common law system, are at some significant points different from
the law of the United States. The treatment accorded problems in the
two countries involving "impossibility" of performance and "frustra-
tion of purpose" present good examples of the differences. Indeed the
latter doctrine, "frustration" in the sense of the well-known Coronation
cases, 1 may not have a genuine counterpart in the law of Japan.
Historically the differentiation between impossibility and frustration
has been difficult enough in the common law, as casual reading of the
examples used by Judge Williams in Krell v. Henry2 will illustrate.
Japanese law, for reasons which will be illustrated below, has not
experienced a similar confusion of these two situations. The American
Law Institute's Restatement of Contracts3 provides definitions in sec-
tion 288 for frustration and in sections 454 through 469 for impossi-
bility which will be useful in this paper. Our objective will be to see
the extent to which these doctrines are duplicated in the sales law of the
two systems and to see, where no exact counterparts exist, how similar
problems are resolved.
II. IMTPOSSIBILITY IN SALES CONTRACTS
In both Japan and the United States, supervening impossibility will
often relieve an obligor from the duty to perform an executory, con-
tractual obligation. Some civilian lawyers have called this the rule of
hnpossibilium nulla obligatio, and the Japanese Civil Code provides
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Hokkaido. LL.B., 1948, J.D., 1961,
Tokyo University.
** Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.S., 1948, LL.B., 1949, Washing-
ton; LL.M., 1953, Chicago; LL.D., 1959, Pacific Lutheran.
1 The "Coronation cases" arose when the illness of Albert Edward, later King
Edward VII of England, forced postponement or cancellation of many public cere-
monies and private understakings. Perhaps the decision in Krell v. Henry, [1903]
2 K.B. 740, is the best known of the group.
- [1903] 2 KFB. 740.
'A source of the Restatenent with commentary is available to civilian lawyers
in Hay, Zun Megfall der Geschaftsgrundlage in Anglo-Amerikanischen Recht,
A.c.P. 164, 231.
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for the situation, albeit in a somewhat indirect fashion, by the following
article:'
If an obligor fails to effect performance in accordance with the tenor and
purport of the obligation, the obligee may demand compensation for
damages; the same shall apply in cases where performance becomes im-
possible for any cause for which the obligor is responsible.
The significance of this article lies in the negative implication arising
from the concluding clause; i.e., inasmuch as the obligor is liable for
damages only when performance becomes impossible for reasons which
are the responsibility of the obligor, it follows that he may not be liable
for damages arising out of his failure to perform in other cases. The
ancient common law point illustrated by Paradine v. lane,5 a rule of
strict liability, is not the law of Japan.
Care must be exercised to distinguish this from a closely related
principle, stated as articles 534 through 536 of the Civil Code of Japan,G
describing the duty of the obligee in such transactions to pay for the
"goods" notwithstanding destruction or damage. The latter principle
4 JAPANESE CIVIL CODE art. 415. [This translation, and those of the Civil Code
articles which follow, are taken from 2 Eibun h6reisha Law Bulletin Series No.
2100 (1966), hereinafter cited as EHS.1
Aleyn, 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647).
'JAPANESE CIVnL CODE:
Article 534:
(1) Where the creation or transfer of a real right over a specific thing is made
the object of a bilaterial contract and the thing is lost or damaged by any cause
for which the obligor is not responsible, such loss or damage shall be borne
by the obligee.
(2) The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall apply to a contract relating
to a non-specific thing as from the time when the thing has become specific in
accordance with the provisions of Article 401 paragraph 2.
Article 535:
(1) The provisions of the preceding Article shall not apply in cases where the
subject-matter of a bilateral contract subject to a suspensive condition has been
lost during the pendency of the condition.
(2) If the thing has been damaged by any cause for which the obligor is not
responsible, such damage shall be borne by the obligee.
(3) If the thing has been damaged by any cause for which the obligor is
responsible, the obligee may, in the event of the fulfillment of the condition,
demand either the performance of the contract or the rescission thereof, at his
option; this shall not, however, preclude a demand of compensation for damages.
Article 536:
(1) Except in the cases mentioned in the preceding two Axticles, if the per-
formance of an obligation becomes impossible by any cause for which neither
of the parties is responsible, the obligor is not entitled to counter-performance.
(2) If performance becomes impossible by any cause for which the obligee is
responsible, the obligor shall not lose his right to demand counter-performance;
however, if he has received any benefit through being relieved of his own
obligation, he shall return such benefit to the obligee.
A quick, if superficial, comparison to United States law on this point can be made
by reading UxrFoRo COmmERCLAL CODE (hereinafter cited UCC) §§ 2-509, 2-510. [All
references to the UCC are to the U~nio A Co maRcIAL CODE 1962 OFFIcAL TEXT
wITH COimENiS].
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deals with the phenomenon which the American lawyer would call the
"risk of loss," and is a problem not dealt with in this paper.7 One
must also distinguish the case in which a debt has already come into
existence-a matured money obligation-from which the debtor is not
discharged by reason of Acts of God." Obviously this is not the same
problem as that of the duty of an obligor, in an executory sales con-
tract, whose contemplated performance has been significantly altered
by events occurring since the formation of the contract.
The doctrine of impossibility expressed by the Japanese Civil Code
was, for a substantial period of time, uncertain in application because
of arguments derived from the comparable provisions of the German
Code.' In particular, it was questioned whether impossibility included
only the instances of performance which were physically impossible or
also included cases of unusual hardship-the kinds of cases in which
the law of the United States excuses performance under the rubric
"impracticability because of extreme and unreasonable difficulty, ex-
pense, injury or loss involved."'1
Comparison of the United States and Japanese justiciable law on this
issue is difficult because of the paucity of pertinent Japanese case law.
Such cases as do exist are illuminating, however, and taken together
spell out a pattern of relatively liberal exculpation.
Several of these decisions merit closer scrutiny. The case of Igarashi
v. Igarashi involved a contract in which the plaintiff was to buy
noodles from a manufacturer. After formation of the contract, but
before the day set for performance, the buyer obtained a provisional
disposition (a specie of injunction) over the seller-manufacturer's
equipment. This "provisional disposition" was resorted to in aid of
plaintiff's attempt to collect a debt owing him by the seller from
another transaction. The consequences, as asserted by the seller, were
that he was unable to use his equipment and could not produce nor
deliver the noodles by the agreed date.
The court then faced two questions: (1) was it apparent that the
parties contemplated the noodles to be produced in the seller's factory
and, if so, (2) did the non-availability of the factory under these cir-
cumstances relieve the seller's obligation?
7 However, see Tanikawa, Risk of Loss under Japanese Sales Contracts, 42 WAsH.
L. RE%. 463 (1967).
s JAPANESE CIL CODE art. 419(2).
'For a summary of these arguments, see I L~mNz, LEHRBUCH DES SCHULDRECHTS
(Treatise on the law of obligations) 230-43 (1963).
t0 See RESTATEUJENT, CONMACTS § 454 (1932) ; UCC § 2-615.
26 Minroku 435 (Gr. Ct. Cass., April 5, 1920).
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With reference to the first point the Court stated that since it was
ordinarily the case for producers of noodles to engage in producing
noodles with their own equipment, it must have been the parties' inten-
tion in the contract in question, unless a different intention appeared,
that the seller produce noodles with his own equipment to meet the
buyer's demands. 2 The other point-who was responsible for the
unavailability of the equipment-was settled in the producer's favor
without discussion. The court thus concluded that the producer was
not in breach, because the performance bargained for was made im-
possible by a circumstance for which the producer was not respon-
sible."3
The case of Gotj v. Shibuya'4 held that a seller who had promised to
deliver rice from Inchon, Korea, to Tokyo, Japan, could not be held
liable when the Sino-Japanese War caused such a demand for boats
that shipment was rendered "impossible." As in the Igarashi decision,
it was stressed that this "impossibility" was not one for which the
defendant was responsible.
Essentially the same decision as that reached in the GotJ case, was
announced in Kan v. Munekata.' The seller in that case found it
"impossible" to deliver oil from Japan to China. The court said the
delivery was not physically impossible, but that the nonperformance
fell into a category of an impossibility for which the obligor was not
responsible, when viewed with "an ordinary sense of the society" of
those days.
The inability of a shipper to obtain a vessel, even without fault on
his part, has not always seemed good reason for discharging him from
liability in the opinion of American courts.' Even under the more
' A similar conclusion could be reached in the United States, but not quite so
painlessly. Indeed some cases such as the casebook favorite, Whitman v. Anglum,
92 Conn. 392, 103 At. 114 (1918), would go the opposite way. For a discussion of
the conflict in American law, see 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACrs § 1952 (rev. ed. 1938).
However, UCC § 2-615, comment 5, says the obligor is excused when the source
was "contemplated or assumed by the parties at the time of contracting."
IsInability to perform because of inadequate finances does not often commend
itself as a defense in the United States cases. Western Drug Supply & Specialty
Co. v. Board of Administration, 106 Kan. 256, 187 Pac. 701 (1920). Under RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRAcTS § 455 (1932), producer's difficulty would probably be called "sub-jective" and not found to be reason for excuse. It may be that the Japanese court
regarded buyer's conduct (the "provisional disposition") as a type of prevention
or hindrance of the seller's performance. If so, it is not evident from the report.
1H6RITSU SHIMBUN (No. 4655) 13 (1941) (Korea High Ct., Dec. 3, 1940).
H6RITSU SHIMBUN (No. 4702) 19 (Japan General Consulate in Sainan, April
26, 1941).
"
0 E.g., Pratt v. Schreiber, 213 Mo. App. 268, 249 S.W. 449 (1923); Eppens,
Smith & Wiemann Co. v. Littlejohn, 164 N.Y. 187, 58 N.E. 19 (1900).
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liberal provisions of the UCC, the GotJ and Kan cases would produce
interesting debate.17
A Japanese court has also had occasion to wrestle with the case of a
delayed shipment. The difficult question was how to handle the injury
to the buyer, caused by the delay, when the seller, because of an
"unavoidable event," could not be held liable for breach. The case
involved a German seller whose delivery of a locomotive to Japan was
delayed three months by the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war. The
buyer offered to pay the price, reduced by an amount equivalent to the
loss allegedly resulting from the delay. This offer was rejected by the
seller who demanded, and sued for, the full price. The Japanese court
saw the question as one of breach: was the seller liable for damages or
not? The contract had a provision excusing liability when nonper-
formance resulted from "an unavoidable event." The court denied the
buyer any reduction in price.'
At this juncture the lawyer will search for alternatives. Could the
buyer have asserted a defense based upon a partial failure of considera-
tion? Was there an election worked in the buyer's acceptance of a
late delivery? Must a Japanese buyer always pay full price for a
defective performance when he has no breach action against the
seller?' These are helpful inquiries because they introduce one to the
differences in analysis which lie beneath the seemingly quite similar
treatment of the impossibility cases in Japan and the United States.
The civilian lawyer, not using the common law concept of considera-
"Were they contracts for the sale of rice and oil, with delivery an incidental
aspect, or was delivery "the very heart of the agreement"? See UCC § 2-614, com-
ment 1. The buyer may have had, under the UCC, at least a right to a substitute
performance.
'Judgment of April 17, 1907, 1 SAIKiN HANEEE 74 (Tokyo High Ct.). JAPANESE
CIVIL CODE art. 536(1) provides, with certain exceptions, that: "if the performance
of an obligation becomes impossible by any cause for which neither of the parties
is responsible, the obligor is not entitled to counter-performance." This obviously
is a "total failure" situation not applicable to the simple delay in shipment.
"The questions are difficult to resolve under either body of law. A buyer who is
informed, or who learns, of an actual deficiency in seller's performance, not caused
by a breach, usually is put to an election. In common law a "total" failure of con-
sideration is needed for contract rescission-a rule softened somewhat by UCC §
2-616 which permits the buyer to "terminate and thereby discharge any unexecuted
portion of the contract!' when he learns "of a material or indefinite delay." Failing
to act, the buyer may be compelled to accept a substitute performance.
Perhaps the Japanese buyer could have used the mechanism provided by JAPANEsE
Civ=. CODE art. 541: "If one of the parties does not perform his obligation, the
other party may fix a reasonable period and demand its performance, and may rescind
the contract, if no performance is effected within such period."
Both the Japanese article and the UCC provision seem intended "to establish ...
machinery for providing certainty as to when a supervening and excusing con-
tingency 'excuses' the delay, 'discharges' the contract, or may result in a waiver of
the delay by the buyer." See UCC § 2-616, comment.
1967]
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tion, must ask these questions in other terms.
Naturally enough, the Japanese law recognizes a distinction between
a "final" and a "temporary" impossibility situation. A circumstance
which may justify delay in performance by a seller may not finally
discharge him from the obligation. This was demonstrated in the case
of Clerunce v. Nakakara0 where a strike-a temporary disruption-
excused the seller's delay although it would not have enabled him to
terminate thp contract.2 '
Just as the American businessman is prone to do, so the Japanese
seller will frequently resort to special terms in the contract to clarify
the consequences of "impossibility." A typical provision is as follows:
A party is excused from his obligation if a complete or partial delay of
performance, or if the impossibility of delivery of goods as promised in
the contract, is caused by a natural calamity, a war, a riot, an insurrec-
tion, an amendment, abolition or establishment of laws, an ordinance or
disposition by public power, a strike or other acts of dispute, an accident
on transport organ, and other Acts of God. In this situation, the part of
this contract, concerning which the impossibility in delivery was caused,
is considered to have been rescinded.
Up to this point one can find a clear thread of authority in the
Japanese Civil Code and, even though they are few, in the decisions.
It may be useful to make a few summarizing observations before
leaving this relatively secure ground:
(1) The authorities above identify the defense available to the
Japanese seller when an event, not his doing and not a circumstance for
which he is responsible, makes his performance impossible or (in the
United States sense) commercially impractical. This defense, avail-
able by implication from Civil Code article 415 or by express term of
the contract, is closely comparable to the defense available in the
United States law.
(2) When the seller cannot make out such a defense (for example
when he is responsible for the circumstance which renders his per-
formance impossible), he is in breach and the injured buyer may
either recover damages under article 415, or rescind.2 It must be em-
phasized that the buyer's relief, whether rescission or damages, is
H6RITsU SHIMBUN (No. 2227) 16 (1924) (Tokyo App. Ct., Dec. 28, 1923).
2 REsTA TMENT, CONTRACrs § 462 (1932), would lead to the same result. "Tem-
porary" impossibility is not the same as "partial" impossibility under either body
of law. How to handle the case of indefinite delay is discussed in note 19 supra.
'JAPANEsE CIVIL CODE art. 541, quoted supra note 19; id. art. 543: "If per-
formance has become impossible in whole or in part by any cause for which the
obligor is responsible, the obligee may rescind the contract."
[ VOL. 42 : 445
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predicated upon a breach theory and not a failure of consideration.
(3) Where the seller does have a defense of impossibility, and the
buyer accordingly does not have an action for breach (neither damages
nor rescission) the allocation of any loss is made under the Civil Code
articles dealing with "Risk of Loss." These articles place the loss upon
the buyer where the goods are "ascertained" and "specific," 2 unless
the contract is subject to an unresolved "suspensive condition."2 If,
however, the contract did not apply to ascertained goods, and none
were specified before the impossibility arose, the seller has no claim
against the buyer unless the impossibility was the responsibility of the
buyer. In the latter event, the seller may demand performance by the
buyer but must recognize any mitigation of damages occasioned by
the fact that he need not perform himself.2
5
(4) These remedies apply in instances of "final" impossibility.
Most of these principles, at least so far as the results are concerned,
are consistent with the law of the United States. Difficulty may be
anticipated, however, as one leaves the routine commercial problems
and examines the more complex (and obviously rarer) problems clus-
tered around the concept of "frustration."
III. FRusTRATioN IN SALES CONTRACTS
A. Change of Circumstances Principle
It should be apparent that the common law concept of frustration-
whether thought of as a defense based upon failure of consideration or
as the non-occurrence of an implied condition constructed upon the
premise of contemplated value to be obtained by one party to the
exchange-will not be found in the civil law: at least not by that
name, nor explained in that fashion.
What the civil law does have is the theory of rebus sic stantibus 6
This theory appeared with frequency in the early European cases but
was disapproved during the nineteenth century. It was not enacted
into code form, because it was thought contrary to the basic principle
of pacta sunt servanda. The original Japanese code, patterned after
the German and Swiss law, contained no mention of the theory.
' JAPANESE CiVIL CODE art. 534 (1), quoted supra note 6.
"' JAPANESE CiVm CODE art 535, quoted supra note 6.
'JAPANESE CIVIL CODE art. 536(2), quoted supra note 6.
-'This phrase, as used in the civil law, means that a promise (or the promises in
a contract) was made upon a tacit assumption that an existing factual situation,
which has significance to the undertaldng, will remain basically unchanged. It
may be thought of as an implied-in-fact condition to the promisor's duty.
1967]
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Economic problems associated with World War I, and the resulting
changes in social and political life, highlighted those inadequacies in
the pacta sunt servanda principle which had produced the earlier efforts
to modify the doctrine. The civil law jurisdictions renewed their
interest in the earlier rebus sic stantibus decisions. Out of this effort
came the Geschftsgrundlage theory in Germany and the concept of
imprivision in France. By the 1920's the impact of these doctrines
was felt in Japan; a legal scholar, since recognized as the leading expo-
nent of the new doctrine, set out an argument for relief from obligation
on the theory of jij6 henk6 no gensoku-the "principle of change in
circumstances.""
Even though the German cases and scholarship contributed greatly
to the Japanese developments, Professor Katsumoto ultimately pat-
terned his concept more nearly after the French theory of imprevision.
This is reflected in his definition which states essentially:",
The change of circumstances theory changes the effect of the law by
making it more in accord with the rule of Good Faith. When the change
in circumstances occurs, without the fault of either party, between the
formation of the contract and the time fixed for performance, and when
the change of circumstance was so unforeseeable and of such character
that the continuation of the obligation to perform is inconsistent with
the rule of Good Faith, then the legal obligation should, because of the
change in circumstances, be governed by the principle of Good Faith
rather than the stricter law.
This theory won acceptance by the legal scholars of Japan. In a
few situations it was enacted into legislation. Perhaps the clearest
illustration of legislative use is the set of statutes, relating to leases of
land, which provide that the parties may increase or decrease the rent
if the agreed sum becomes unreasonable in comparison to rental or
sale value of adjacent parcels, or because of changes in the tax laws.2
Although generally accepted by Japanese legal scholars, Professor
Katsumoto's theory was not applied by the Japanese courts for two
decades-probably because the issue was never stated in a reported
case rather than because the theory was unacceptable to the courts.
It was during the Second World War when the Great Court of Cessa-
tion applied the "principle of change in circumstances" in Izumikoji
IKATsuMOTO, MIMP6 NI OKERU JIJ6 HENKO NO GENSOKU (Change of circum-
stances theory in civil law) (1926).
Id. at 567.
S akuchih6 (Land lease law) art 12 (Law No. 49, 1921), in 2 EHS No. 2130;
Stakuyah6 (House lease law) art. 7 (Law No. 50, 1921), in 2 EHS No. 2131.
[ VOL. 42: 445
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v. Ichida,3° allowing the vendee to rescind a contract for the sale of
land. In that case the plaintiff entered into a contract to purchase from
the defendant certain land which would be suitable for a factory. At
that time plaintiff paid earnest money, and law day for payment of the
balance of the purchase price was two years later. Subsequent to
execution of the agreement, but prior to law day, a regulation was
enacted which required government approval of the purchase price in
all land sales. The defendant made timely application for approval in
accordance with the regulation. When law day arrived, however,
approval had not yet been granted; nor could it be determined at that
time whether approval would ever be granted, or what form such
approval might take. Because of this change of circumstances, the
Court allowed plaintiff to rescind the contract and to recover the
earnest money. The Court was of the opinion that it would be unfair
to require the parties to be bound by a contract over such an uncer-
tain period.
Thus, the "principle of change in circumstances" has become a
recognized part of the Japanese law. There are to this date very few
sale-of-goods decisions which mention the doctrine. It has been rec-
ognized in general contract disputes however and, as suggested above,
has been used frequently in agreements for the sale of land. Since one
may reasonably assume that the same application will be made in
disputes involving the sale of goods, it becomes important to examine
some of the cases.
According to Professor Katsumoto's original thesis, the change of
circumstance theory should be applicable only when the changes are
so great that insistence upon literal performance would violate the
idea of good faith. This idea-unconscionability, in a single word-
has become the pivotal thought in the decided cases. An example can
be found in Igucki v. Ikegami.31 The parties had agreed that an
existing lease was to be terminated and the premises vacated during
October 1943. The lessee did not quit the premises, although fre-
quently requested to do so, and the lessor delayed bringing an action
to evict (first as an accommodation to the lessee and later because
some United States military personnel were in residence) until 1949.
The lessee opposed the lessor's attempt to enforce the agreement to
vacate by pleading a change of circumstances; namely, the severe
23 Minshfi 613 (Gr. Ct. Cass., Dec. 6, 1944).
" 8 Minshfi 448 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 12, 1954).
1967
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housing shortage caused by air raids subsequent to the date of the
agreement.
The trial court said the lessee, to prevail in his argument, must
establish four points: (1) the existence of greatly changed circum-
stances; (2) unforeseeability; (3) absence of responsibility, or fault,
for the change; and, (4) the unconscionable, or lack of good faith,
quality of the lessor's demand for performance. The decision, which
went against the lessee on the fourth point, was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court.
Even though applicability of the rule was denied, the case states that
if the lessee had prevailed he could have either (1) modified the
original promise to vacate, or (2) rescinded the promise entirely.
Other cases in which the principle was discussed dealt with attempts
to rescind contracts for the sale of land. In each of these cases the
price had been agreed upon before Japan's monetary system experi-
enced the great inflation which accompanied the Second World War,
while the date fixed for performance came after the inflation had
occurred. The sellers argued that the change in money value was so
great that the buyers could not, in good conscience, demand per-
formance at the original price. It was easy to show that conditions had
changed greatly and that the sellers were not responsible for the
change. Such proof met at least three of the four prerequisites listed
in the Iguchi case, and the sellers were successful in a group of lower
court decisions.3"
As could be predicted, inflation also produced arguments founded
upon the change of circumstances theory in cases of long term debts.
Is the creditor in such instances entitled to claim a sum which in
terms of buying power approximates the value originally promised, or
must he accept payment in the number of money units originally
stipulated? Germany had such cases following the First World War,
and its Supreme Court allowed an Aufwertung-an upward re-evalua-
tion-of debts."3 However this precedent is virtually unique in legal
history and "nominalism" is clearly the usual rule.
Although Japanese creditors faced devastating inflation, the post-
war diet declined to adopt special legislation. Denied legislative as-
Sawabe v. Sat6, HAmEI JUH6 (No. 210) 27 (1960) (Tokyo Dist. Ct, Nov. 26,
1959) ; Wada v. Kamei, 10 Kakyfi minshii 1812 (Osaka Dist. Ct, Aug. 29, 1959);
Munehiro v. Nagae Sangy6 K.K., 7 Kakyi minshfi 741 (Kanazawa Dist. Ct, March
24, 1956).
'Judgment of Nov. 28, 1923, 107 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivil-
sachen 107 (Reichsgericht).
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sistance, creditors turned to the courts for aid under the change of
circumstances theory. An instance of this type of case involved a
bondholder who in 1957, upon maturity of a bond issued in 1934,
asked that the Japanese court order the debtor to pay 300 times the
face amount of the instrument. The request was denied. 4 Even
though Japanese legal scholars generally favor a re-evaluation of debts
to compensate for inflation, neither the legislative nor judicial forum
has been responsive to requests for such action.
One reason for this intransigence in the inflation cases, at least
those in which the credit was extended after the inflation had com-
menced, was the absence of the one prerequisite which had not re-
ceived much attention in the land sale inflation cases above. Unfore-
seeability, it will be recalled, is one of the four requirements. The
same deficiency, failure to establish unforeseeability, was critical in
another set of facts which came before the Japanese Supreme Court."
In 1944 the plaintiff had sold a home to the buyer on time. After the
contract had been made, but before performance by the buyer was
completed, the plaintiff's own home (not the house sold to buyer) was
destroyed in a bombing raid. Seller, contending he would never have
sold the house if he had known of the impending destruction of his
home, prayed for a rescission. In denying the relief, the Court held
that the loss by air raid was foreseeable in 1944 when the contract was
made.
Of the four prerequisites to relief, the one most difficult to analyze
systematically is the requirement that the demand for literal per-
formance must be unconscionable. A fairer translation of the Japa-
nese, is that the demand must be consistent with the "principle of Good
Faith." It will be helpful at this point to observe just how basic to the
Civil Code this concept actually is.
Most civil law codes have an article on good faith. Japan was late
in enacting an express provision-an interesting fact because the Japa-
nese courts had been borrowing the idea from the German and Swiss
provisions for some time. It was not until 1947 that the Japanese
Civil Code was amended to include an explicit good faith statement.
Article 1(2) now provides: "The exercise of rights and performance
of duties shall be done in faith and in accordance with the principle of
" K6no v. K.K. Nihon Kangy6 Gink6, 15 Minshfi 1602 (Sup. Ct, June 20, 1961).
See also Ikuyo, Civil Law 1961-1963, The Japan Annual of Law and Politics,
Nov. 12, 1964, pp. 34-35.
' Suzuki v. Kawanokani, 8 MinshCi 234 (Sup. Ct, Jan. 28, 1954).
19671
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trust." Even though the immediate ancestry of the article is Euro-
pean, 6 the United States has a relative in the provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code.3 7
The good faith rule has an obvious "equitable" flavor, and just as
a common law suitor for equity may be denied relief because of
laches, so may the Japanese petitioner be denied relief under the
principle of changed circumstances when he has "slept on his rights."
This lesson was learned by the owner of a home who contracted to sell
for Y80,000, received Y20,000 down payment, and could have received
the balance due in three months by registering a conveyance. For
fourteen months (July 1945 to September 1946), while the value of
the yen depreciated dramatically, the seller failed to convey and make
his demand. When finally he did act and asked for Y240,000, instead
of Y60,000, the Court denied relief, noting that although there was a
change of circumstance in this case, it was entirely against faith and
trust to allow the seller to enjoy the privilege of the principle of change
of circumstances since he had already delayed his own performance
at the time the change occurred.38
The cases reviewed above, involving conveyances, leases, and infla-
tion, comprise almost the entire body of law dealing with this Japanese
variety of "frustration." Only one case has recognized the argument
in a sale-of-goods problem. 9 It is a significant decision, however, be-
cause the argument based upon the principle was successful and also
because it indicates the type of relief available where the doctrine is
recognized.
The case dealt with a contract giving plaintiff the exclusive right to
sell a manufacturer's line of fish netting dye. Plaintiff was required to
deposit Y15,000 with the manufacturer who, thus protected, promised
to deliver the dye to buyers named by plaintiff. The manufacturing
plant and both parties were then (December 1944) in Korea. Plaintiff
instructed defendant to deliver 1,300 units of dye to a specified buyer.
Defendant managed to deliver 500 units but, because of critical ship-
ping problems, he could not deliver the other 800. At the end of the
war in August 1945, the defendant was compelled to dispose of his
"The Japanese application is closer at this point to the German B0RGERLICHES
GESETZBUCH art. 242, and further from the French CODE CIVlLE art. 1134(3), than was
the case at an earlier point in history.
'UCC §2-615 is an example of a "good faith" requirement much like the
"change of circumstances" principle even though much more limited in scope. Cf.
the limited definition of good faith at UCC § 1-201 (19).
Hirai v. Shibata, 5 Minsha 36 (Sup. Ct, Feb. 6, 1951).
" Fujisawa v. Nakamura, 2 Kaky-i minshii 146 (Nara Dist. Ct., Feb. 6, 1951).
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Korean property and return to Japan. The plaintiff, having made
formal demand for performance within twenty days without avail, sued
for rescission and damages on the theory of a breach by the defen-
dant.40 The court found that the manufacturer, so far as the damage
claim was concerned, had a defense of impossibility.4 However, the
rescission claim was found to be supportable upon the change of cir-
cumstance, without a showing of breach, and was accordingly allowed.
The significance of the case just discussed must not be missed: a
disappointed contracting party may have a remedy in rescission (or
sometimes in a modification of the contract) on the theory of change
in circumstances even when the defendant is not in breach. To a com-
mon law attorney, who thinks in terms of failure of consideration, this
may at first seem fairly unexciting. To appreciate its meaning to the
Japanese, it must be kept in mind that in the civil law, obligation is not
based upon "consideration." The principle of change of circumstance,
as a departure from pacta sunt servanda, will then be recognized as
equally pioneering with Lord Mansfield's development of the "con-
structive condition" as an exception to the rule of strict liability in the
common law.
B. Remedies Available upon Application of the Change of
Circumstances Principle
The remaining task is to explore the consequences resulting from
the recognition of the change of circumstances theory. For this, we
must turn to another group of authorities.
At the outset, one must notice that procedural differences between
the legal systems in Japan and the United States account for some of
the major variations in application of the "impossibility" or "frustra-
tion" doctrines. For example, the principle of change of circumstances
can be raised as a basis for relief in a petition for appellate review
even though the argument was not introduced in the trial court.42 The
procedural rules of a United States court would, of course, not permit
a novel substantive argument at a comparable stage of the trial.
"'JAPANESE: Csvn. CODE art. 541, quoted supra note 19, permits the fixing of a
time for performance and allows rescission if the performance is not given. Article
415 (quoted in text accompanying note 4 supra) establishes an action for damages
for obligor's wrongful failure to perform. Lawyers in the United States whose
interest is aroused by the availability of both rescission and damages, sometimes
thought to be inconsistent remedies, should examine the buyer's remedies under
UCC § 2-711.
41 Cf. text accompanying note 22 supra.
-Iwanari v. Kurihara, 10 Minshfi 342 (Sup. Ct., April 6, 1956).
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As the cases discussed earlier demonstrate, the principle of change
of circumstances is essentially (if one uses the nomenclature of Amer-
ican law) an equitable and a defensive allegation. Recovery of dam-
ages, not available by reason of changed circumstances alone, would
depend upon a showing of breach and the action would be maintained
under the other, previously described, articles of the Civil Code. The
relief available upon successful showing of the change of circumstances
will be either rescission or a modification of the contract.
Rescission is the more common consequence. In cases involving a
single exchange or sale, rescission is given a retroactive effect and, by
provision of Civil Code article 545, restitution is required of any par-
tial performances.43 By this provision the Japanese code settles one
problem which perplexed the English courts in Chandler v. Webster
and in the Fibrosa case.44 When the contract is for a continuing supply
of goods (the installment contract with reciprocal deliveries and pay-
ments) and an application of the change of circumstances principle is
permitted, the relief will apply only to executory portions of the agree-
ment.
The difficult problem of apportionment of loss when the seller's per-
formance has resulted in loss to him without any enrichment to the
buyer seems not to have received attention in Japanese law."
Rescission, as just pointed out, is the usual remedy when literal
performance is no longer a right which the promisee will be permitted
JAPA EsE CIVm CODE art. 545:
(1) If one of the parties has exercised his right of rescission, the other party
is bound to restore the former to his original position; however, the rights of
third persons shall not be prejudiced thereby.
(2) Interest shall be paid upon any money to be repaid in the case mentioned
in the preceding paragraph as from the time when such money was first received.
(3) The exercise of a right of recission shall not preclude a demand of com-
pensation for damages.
"Chandler v. Webster, [1904] 1 K.B. 493, was one of the famous "Coronation
cases." It held that a hirer of rooms who had paid in advance could not recover
despite cancellation of the royal procession which he had intended to view from the
rooms. The subsequent case of Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson
Combe Barbour, Ltd., [1943] A.C. 32, overruled the Chandler ruling and held that a
Polish firm which had contracted to buy machines from an English manufacturer,
and had paid a sum in advance, might recover the down payment on a quasi-
contractual theory when supervening war made delivery of the goods impossible.
'The apportionment issue was the real bone of contention in the Fibrosa case,
supra note 44. The English parliament responded to that decision with the Law
Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 40, which does permit
equitable apportionment at least when buyer has made an advance payment.
If RESTATEmENT, CoNrTAcrs § 468 (1932), is taken to represent authority in the
United States, the manufacturer who has been put to expense of attempted per-
formance is without claim, in the absence of specific contractual provision, unless
the buyer has received benefit. This is the exact quandary which produced the
Frustrated Contracts Act in England. Whether UCC § 2-615 changes the law in this
regard (or makes it clearer at least) is a question discussed in the text infra.
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to demand. It is not necessarily the promisor's first or only gambit
however. The promisor may use the change in circumstances: (1)
as a reason for demanding modification of the contract, resorting to
rescission if this demand is rejected or, perhaps, (2) as grounds to
procure an order by the court modifying the contract without regard
to the assent of the obligee. These two possibilities are best understood
in the context of illustrative cases.
It has already been observed that the Japanese Civil Code provides
that an obligee may fix a time of performance-a final grace period-
as a prelude to rescission.4" This is in keeping with the concept of
"good faith," and the same thinking applies when a promisor believes
altered circumstances have given him reason to refuse literal perfor-
mance. His first step, in good faith, may be to propose a modified
performance which he believes would now be fair4 7 So, for example,
in Mori v. Mori 48 a home-owner who, in 1942, had agreed that the
promisee would be entitled to purchase the home for Y24,500 in 1952,
could at the latter date reply to the promisee's tender of payment and
request for conveyance by demanding a sum (-3,600,000) which more
nearly reflected the current value of the property. Because the buyer
refused to modify pursuant to the seller's demand, a demand the court
thought reasonable in light of the change in money value, the promisor
was permitted to rescind.
This sequence of rescission following obligee's refusal to comply
with a reasonable demand for modification is generally accepted as an
appropriate consequence of change in circumstances. Indeed it was
part of Professor Katsumoto's original thesis. Although the pattern of
the Mori case has not yet been approved by the Japanese Supreme
Court, there is enough authority from decisions of the lower courts and
in legal scholarship that such approval seems certain.
Whether the Japanese courts will take the next step-that of order-
ing a modification to which the promisee refuses to assent, rather than
simply allowing rescission when the requested modification is refused-
" JAPANESE CIVIL CODE art. 541, quoted in note 19 supra.
'7 Cf. UCC §2-614(1) which, as stated in Official Comment 1 to the section:
requires the tender of a commercially reasonable substituted performance where
agreed to facilities have failed or become commercially impracticable .... (a)
reasonable substituted performance tendered by either party should excuse him
from strict compliance with contract terms which do not go to the essence of the
agreement. [Emphasis added.)
The scheme used in the UCC and the Japanese cases is similar. The difference
lies in the significant fact that the substitution, under the UCC provision, is per-
mitted only for "incidental matters," not those which go "to the very heart of the
agreement."
"6 Kakyfi minshi 1698 (Tokyo High Ct., Aug. 26, 1955).
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is still open to debate. One court has traveled at least part of this
route by ordering an increased payment on the assumption that the
buyer would assent if a demand were to be made.4 9 In another case""
the court indicated, in dictum, that it would depart from the demanded
modification (a ten-year postponement of an agreement to vacate
leased premises) and substitute its own "correction" so that the agree-
ment would be "objectively reasonable." The court thought a five-
year extension was justified because of changed circumstances. How-
ever there had already been more than five years' delay and so no
order was entered. Perhaps the conclusion of this debate will be that
modification cannot be effected without mutual agreement. The legal
scholarship on the point is divided, and no court has actually granted
such relief. On the other hand it will be recalled that this is precisely
the result reached by legislation with respect to certain lease prob-
lems.51
Altogether there are not many decisions applying the principle of
change of circumstances; much less is there adequate case precedent
in the specific sales of goods area. As we have demonstrated, the
Civil Code has no provision directed expressly to the sales problem.
In the absence of case and statutory authority it was predictable that
parties would turn to express provision in the contract, and this has
occurred. 2 One standard sale of goods contract form has the following
paragraph:
Each party has a right to make an offer to alter the terms of this contract
when conditions become too unreasonable by virtue of rapid price fluc-
tuation or other changes of circumstance. A party has a right to rescind
the contract when the other party fails to agree to such an alteration, or
when the purpose of the contract can not be preserved by the alteration of
the terms.
The American businessman is likely to approach the modification of
the Japanese contract with two serious misimpressions.
" Oba v. EndS, 9 Kakyu minshi 666 (Sendai High Ct., April 14, 1958).
'Mizushima v. Yoshiwara, 18 HANREi TAImUZU 62 (1952) (Osaka Dist. Ct.,
Oct. 20, 1951).
" See note 29 supra.
" For a general discussion of the theories and cases in this connection, see
TANIKAWA, SHOHIN NO BAIBAI (Sales of goods) 277-81 (1964). UCC §,2-616(3)
limits the power of the parties to use a clause "made in advance of trouble" to con-
trol the consequences of unforeseen circumstances. Presumably the "Good Faith"
rule of the Japanese Civil Code would also set limits to how much may be exacted
by advance agreement.
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The first of these is that there will be a renegotiation with a bar-
gaining, take-it-or-leave-it, environment. This frame of mind springs
from a conviction that courts do not write new contracts for the parties.
Possibly that bit of dictum is true in American law; it is not a safe
premise in Japanese law.
The second misconception is that there will have to be some rear-
rangement, or new undertaking, of the "consideration" to support the
modified promise. Every common-law student, practitioner, and judge
knows the frailty of an unsupported executory accord and the painful
story of Foakes v. Beer." But the entire premise is wrong when the
obligation is one based upon the civil law scheme: consideration sim-
ply has no role in the Japanese contract. The novice to this reality
may learn the hard way that he has no second chance to escape the
modification to which he has assented nor, worse yet, any real alterna-
tive to either modification or rescission when the contemplated cir-
cumstances have changed.
How nearly does the principle of change of circumstances duplicate
the principle that a promisor is discharged when, without his fault,
"the assumed possibility of a desired object or effect ... [which]
forms the basis on which both parties enter into [the contract] ...
is or surely will be frustrated... "?"4 Whether this Restatement of
Contracts blackletter rule ever represented the decisions in the United
States is a fair question, but it was, at the least, the stated rule for
some years.
The new formulation is UCC section 2-615, "Excuse by Failure of
Presupposed Conditions." This section, we are told by official Com-
ment one, "excuses a seller from timely delivery of goods contracted
for, where his performance has become commercially impracticable
because of unforeseen supervening circumstances not within the con-
templation of the parties at the time of contracting." It is a test of
L39 App. Cas. 605 (H.L. 1884). Even earlier, the chancellors were commenting
about the "most extraordinary peculiarity of the English Common Law, [that the
creditor, to bind himself,] could not take 19 s. 6d in the pound; that was nudum
pactum." Couldery v. Bartrum, 19 Ch. D. 394, 399 (C.A. 1880).
This is not the place to rehearse the subsequent history of the rule. The reader
will understand that all which may have been true in 1884 cannot be assumed true
in 1966. The Uniform Commercial Code abounds in cautionary statements regarding
the need for consideration and in some sections provides that none is needed. This
is true for UCC § 2-616. The Official Comment says: "No consideration is necessary
in a case of this kind to support such a modification." Application of the section
is, obviously, not universal.
11 RESTATEMIENT, CoNTRAcTS § 288 (1932).
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"commercial impracticability" to be contrasted with "impossibility,
frustration of performance, or frustration of the venture."15 The
words are new, but does the principle remain the same?
The application of such general statements is admittedly difficult.
"Hard cases," says the adage, "make bad law," and Judge Cardozo
has observed that: "Those who think more of symmetry and logic in
the development of legal rules than of practical adaptation to the at-
tainment of a just result will be troubled by a classification where the
lines of division are so wavering and blurred." 56 There is considerable
force in the arguments advanced by those who contend, in the United
States, for "symmetry and logic" and, in Japan, for pacta sunt ser-
vanda. Nonetheless they seem to have lost the day. The Japanese
jijj kenk no gensoku, and the "equitable principles in furtherance of
commercial standards and good faith" of the Uniform Commercial
Code are the guidelines to be observed. There are procedural differ-
ences of significance; care must be used in shifting from one system to
the other; but the two bodies of law have here found much common
ground.
UCC § 2-615, comments 1, 3.Jacobs & Youngs v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (1921).
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